![]() Does sympathetic coverage of Whites cause support for public health over punishment? Does sympathetic coverage of Blacks have the same effect, or is sympathy racially selective? Prior research neglects these questions, focusing on negative messages about non-Whites. Treatment policies garner widespread support. Unlike media coverage of previous drug epidemics, coverage of opioids focuses on Whites and is often sympathetic. By extending the model, I show how transitional justice effects both necessary conditions, leading to deterrent and strategic effects, which illustrate how interventions aiming to improve stability may work in some instances but backfire in others. The analysis identifies two necessary forces, the threat of rebellion and economic subversion, which together curb a ruler’s predatory temptations. ![]() Analysis of the sovereignty constraint uncovers a trade-off between political order and economic inequality and identifies the socioeconomic conditions that are necessary for stable political order. I show that the stability of political order essentially requires a ruler to consent to her own removal, giving rise to a key incentive condition-the sovereignty constraint. To understand these challenges, I take a social contract perspective, developing a theoretical framework that highlights the strategic incentives underlying political sovereignty. The potential breakdown of political order stresses the importance of strategic challenges that surface during transitions of power. However, our approach required us to see the full, complicated picture. Had we sought to debunk any of the three with ex post specification searches, we could have done so. Each study replicates well in some areas and poorly in others. Drawing on ideas from the open science movement, and showing how they can advance the transparency of observational research, we replicated three prominent studies on irrelevant events and voting behavior: (1) Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels’s 2016 study of droughts and floods (2) Andrew Healy, Neil Malhotra, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo’s 2010 study of college football and (3) Andrew Healy and Neil Malhotra’s 2010 study of tornadoes. How well do voters hold politicians accountable? Although a long-standing research tradition claims that elections are effective tools for the sanctioning and selection of leaders, a more recent literature argues that voters often reward and punish incumbents for “irrelevant events.” The empirical literature on this topic is characterized by conflicting findings. This helps clarify why voters might oppose spending on disaster prevention and sheds light on the nature of voter rationality. ![]() Thus, players could discriminate between institutions that did and did not create incentives for inefficiency. Citizens were sensitive to this, trusting the leader less and contributing less when leaders could benefit from exaggeration. We manipulated whether the institution allowed leaders to personally benefit if citizens contributed too much. Leader players knew the cost of prevention and reported it to citizens, with the option to exaggerate. Citizen players could contribute money to prevent disaster. Is this because the problem is too complex? Or are citizens concerned political elites will behave poorly? Using an experimental economic game that simulates disaster, we tested whether people can understand when an institution incentivizes elites to exaggerate the cost of disaster prevention. We are vulnerable to disasters, yet citizens hesitate to spend on disaster prevention. Our argument has important ramifications for a host of literatures focused on regime type, as well as current debates over the effectiveness of democratic deterrence. By jointly modeling regime type and political environment using data on alliance termination from 1920 to 2001, we show that alliance reliability is a function of a threat environment. Alliances are more likely to be “scraps of paper” when found in more dangerous environments. We explore this argument using the alliance literature and argue that the empirical finding that democracies are more reliable is driven by the tendency of democracies to cluster in peaceful environments. Although studies have demonstrated endogeneity between democracy and peace, few analyze the effects of this joint relationship on democratic differences. We argue that these democratic differences depend on geopolitical environments that make cooperation possible. Democracies are thought to behave differently from other states, particularly when cooperating in international institutions, such as alliances.
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